The struggle that began with US and Israeli assaults on Iran on February 28, 2026, and escalated all through the Arabian Gulf, might nicely be the third Gulf struggle that may have a wider affect on international vitality safety and markets. The opposite two conflicts had been the Iran-Iraq struggle of 1980-1988 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the struggle of liberation from August 1990 to February 1991. These and the Arab-Israeli struggle in October 1973 — and the accompanying oil provide disaster — formed international oil and vitality relations in addition to the Center East and its relationship with the world for many years.
The scope and affect of the third Gulf struggle have an effect on all Gulf states, all vitality sources, and all their associated infrastructure, together with the security of navigation via the Strait of Hormuz. This has impacted international provides of crude oil, petroleum merchandise, and liquefied pure fuel (LNG), with the dimensions of the availability interruptions various throughout Gulf international locations. For instance, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar’s crude exports had been among the many most impacted, given non-existent various export shops. Likewise, all of Kuwait and Bahrain’s product exports, together with Qatar’s LNG exports, have been impacted by the insecurity of passage via the Strait.
The disaster interrupted the stream of an estimated 12mn b/d of crude oil via the Strait of Hormuz, equal to round 12% of worldwide oil provide, 83% of Gulf crude exports, and 14% of worldwide traded crude oil. This included about 3.3mn b/d from Iraq, 1.3mn b/d from Kuwait, 0.6mn b/d from Qatar, 2mn b/d from the UAE, and 5.5mn b/d from Saudi Arabia. Because of this, manufacturing in these international locations fell from round 21mn b/d in January 2026 to 14.0mn b/d in March, with Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, recording the sharpest decline in crude oil manufacturing
The focusing on of the Ras Laffan fuel services in Qatar additionally led to the shutdown of most of its fuel manufacturing. With no various route for LNG exports besides via the Strait, this amounted to about 106bcm from Qatar and 7bcm from the UAE — collectively roughly 19% of worldwide LNG commerce. Together with this LNG, some 30-35% of worldwide manufacturing of helium (necessary for semiconductor, aerospace and electronics manufacturing) is interrupted. The focusing on of some regional refineries additionally halted their operations.
As well as, the interruption of almost 3.5mn b/d of refined merchandise via the Strait, representing round 15% of worldwide merchandise commerce, compelled regional refineries, significantly the export-oriented ones in Kuwait and Bahrain, to chop runs or shut down and enhance native storage. The presence of greater than half of Saudi Arabia’s 3.3mn b/d refining capability in refineries on the Pink Beach and the Riyadh refinery, and the pliability of its provide methods, helped reduce the affect of the closure of the Strait on its exports of refined merchandise (MEES, 3 April). The Strait’s closure additionally impacted the deliveries of liquified petroleum gases (LPG) to Asia, estimated at round 1.5mn b/d and representing round 29% of its worldwide commerce. It additionally impacted the passage of round 20% of all seaborne fertilizer exports primarily to Asia, doubtlessly driving up international meals manufacturing prices – and posing inflationary pressures. The Strait can also be an important channel for imports to all of the international locations surrounding it, together with meals, medicines and technological provides.
To handle the interruption of its exports from the Arabian Gulf, Aramco rerouted flows to its 7mn b/d East-West Pipeline to the Pink Beach — roughly 2mn b/d of which serves native refineries on the Pink Beach — to export via Yanbu, whose crude oil tanker-loading capability is estimated at 5mn b/d, along with product exports of round 1mn b/d. Aramco’s upgrading of the pipeline and port, along with re-routing of the tanker fleet of transport firm Bahri, restricted the discount in Saudi exports and the full disruption to crude provides from the Strait of Hormuz closure to 9.2mn b/d, and refined merchandise to 2.5mn b/d.
Though Adnoc has a pipeline able to transport as much as 1.8mn b/d from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah, repeated Iranian focusing on of that port decreased its various function as an outlet for Abu Dhabi crude exports.
Regardless of these Hormuz-bypass routes, the disaster nonetheless drove up crude oil costs by greater than 50%, jet gasoline costs nearly doubled in some markets, fuel costs elevated by greater than 70%, and there was a 60% enhance within the Gulf’s urea costs.
The disruption to crude, merchandise, and LNG provides impacts all international locations via larger vitality costs, however the affect of the disaster various throughout the Gulf international locations, importing states, and the worldwide economic system. The affect trusted the construction of the oil trade in every nation, the diploma of diversification of their economies, and their vitality, fiscal and financial coverage responses. The affect on the importing international locations additionally various, with Asia-Pacific states extra susceptible to produce disruptions than Europe and the US. Round 80% of Gulf crude exports go to Asia, primarily China and India, whereas Qatar provides roughly 30% of China’s LNG imports, 45% of India’s, and 99% of Pakistan’s.
Power is necessary to total commerce and funding relations between Asia and the Gulf. The interruption of provides and the ensuing affect on pricing mechanisms and long-term provide contracts affect Asia’s vitality safety, and the Gulf international locations commerce stability with Asia. In 2025, Asia-Pacific imported 50% of its crude, 20% of its refined merchandise, and 29% of its LNG from Gulf international locations. In contrast, the US is a internet exporter of all three, whereas Europe imports round 17%, 20%, and 11% of its wants from the Gulf respectively. Gulf producers exported 2.5mn b/d of refined merchandise (10% of worldwide commerce) and 1.5mn b/d of LPG (28% of worldwide commerce) to Asia; 45% of which was to India.
The size of the affect will rely on the length of the disruptions, the time it takes to carry manufacturing again to its pre-crisis ranges, and the extent of oil and fuel costs throughout and after the disaster. For instance, LNG manufacturing can’t be resumed simply, as a result of it requires cooling to liquefy it, and as soon as liquefaction items are shut down, they should be re-cooled earlier than resuming manufacturing. Crude and refinery manufacturing, against this, differ from one nation to a different relying on geology, working situations, levels of injury to the services, the governance of the oil sector, and the effectivity of every NOC’s crude and refining operations.
This isn’t the primary time that oil provides have been affected by geopolitical battle within the area. Provides had been beforehand disrupted after the October 1973 struggle, when Arab states lower crude manufacturing to strain the worldwide neighborhood for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967, adopted by an oil embargo on the US and the Netherlands. The availability cuts had been round 4.5-5mn b/d for 3 months, representing 8-8.5% of worldwide oil provide. At first of the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran struggle, round 2.3mn b/d had been interrupted for 4 months (3.6% of worldwide provide). After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, round 5mn b/d oil provide was interrupted from the 2 international locations over the following 12 months (7.7% of worldwide provide)
Additionally it is not the primary time throughout which navigation within the Gulf has affected provide safety. Through the Iran-Iraq struggle, 450 ships and 60 tankers had been focused between 1984 and 1988 in what turned often called the “Tankers Warfare.” At the moment, the navies of the foremost powers escorted tankers via the Gulf. Because the Strait itself was not closed, provides weren’t interrupted and costs didn’t rise -they fell and collapsed in 1986 for causes unrelated to the geopolitical disaster.
The responses to the disaster and different provide crises various throughout consuming and producing international locations, relying on many logistical and institutional elements. The IEA’s Worldwide Power Program (IEP), which requires member states to keep up emergency oil shares equal to a minimum of 90 days of imports, and to take part in an allocation mechanism within the occasion of provide disruption was activated through the provide crises together with this one. By the tip of 2025, the IEA’s 32 member states held 1.25bn barrels of emergency shares, sufficient to cowl 28 days of consumption and 50 days of imports, and one other 600 million barrels of trade shares was held beneath authorities obligation. On 11 March 2026, the IEA agreed on the biggest shares drawdown in its historical past, amounting to 412mn barrels, 72% of which crude. By the tip of March, complete disrupted provide was estimated at 320mn barrels, some 75% of the assumed drawdown. A number of the most affected customers, equivalent to China and India, are usually not members of the IEA and didn’t coordinate their responses with it, limiting the flexibility of the inventory launch to mitigate the disaster.
For the IEA, this was the fifth occasion of an emergency strategic inventory drawdown. In January 1991, out of a 33.75mn barrels inventory launch plan, solely 17.3mn barrels had been withdrawn through the struggle to liberate Kuwait. In 2011, 30mn barrels had been launched because of the disruption of Libyan provide. After Hurricane Katrina impacted the refining and distribution services within the US state of Louisiana, 20.8mn barrels had been drawn from an initially deliberate 40mn barrels. The fourth emergency inventory launch of 181.7mn barrels adopted Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. The decrease drawdown than deliberate in a few of these instances was because of the function performed by spare manufacturing capability held in different international locations — primarily Saudi Arabia — the effectivity of markets, the restricted scope of the interruption and the pace of restoration, in addition to the redirection of oil provides.
The present disaster differs from the earlier conflicts because of the sheer measurement of disrupted volumes, the variety of affected exporting and importing international locations, and the impact it has on all hydrocarbons: crude oil, refined merchandise, LNG, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and helium. It additionally differs as a result of one of many key buffers traditionally used towards provide disruption — spare manufacturing capability — is itself additionally impaired. Even the operational shares held by nationwide oil corporations at dwelling or overseas are usually not adequate to offset the lack of exports brought on by the closure of the Strait and the focusing on of refineries or storage services. These shares embody Aramco’s crude inventories exterior Saudi Arabia: 11.2mn barrels in Okinawa and Kiire, Japan, 5.3mn barrels in Ulsan , South Korea, 18.6mn barrels in Zhoushan in China, 6.9mn barrels in Rotterdam, and Aramco’s 37.9mn-barrel share of crude storage at Ain Sokhna and Sidi Kerir in Egypt — a complete of round 80mn barrels (MEES, 13 March).
In comparison with the 1973 voluntary oil provide cuts, which had been reinstated after the embargo, which sparked a world financial and monetary disaster and led to big selection modifications within the international vitality panorama, the present manufacturing disruption differs in lots of respects.
First, a few of the manufacturing, refining, processing and delivering infrastructures of the impacted provides would possibly take longer to rehabilitate (MEES, 20 March).
Second, the present disaster concerned the efficient closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the interruption of all hydrocarbon provides.
Third, whereas the Western hemisphere was extra impacted in 1973, the present disaster affect is extra on the Asian and the Center Jap economies.
Fourth, whereas there have been nearly no significant business or strategic reserves in client markets in 1973, by the tip of 2025 IEA international locations had 2.8 bn barrels of economic oil inventories and 1.25 bn barrels of strategic petroleum reserves, in addition to the estimated complete of 413mn and 50mn barrels of strategic shares in China and India respectively (850mn and 100mn barrels business inventories).
Fifth, whereas international oil provides in 1973 had been managed by the worldwide oil corporations, which might redirect disrupted provides via their built-in international networks, provides from the Gulf international locations within the present disaster are managed by their nationwide oil corporations. Whether or not the March 2026 struggle will produce the form of basic shifts in international vitality safety, oil and fuel markets, and the function of Center East provides that adopted the 1973 vitality disaster, remains to be not clear.
In comparison with all different interruptions, the vitality insurance policies of manufacturing and consuming international locations performed a higher function in mitigating the affect of those crises. Being confined to at least one or two international locations, the fast resumption of manufacturing, provide rerouting, and transport funding had been all essential in overcoming previous crises. The provision of extra manufacturing capability in Saudi Arabia and its use through the totally different provide crises since 1973, made Saudi Arabia the “security valve” of worldwide oil markets, and was in some ways extra necessary than the IEA’s emergency inventory launch. Even when Saudi oil services had been attacked in September 2019 inflicting the lack of 5.7mn b/d of crude manufacturing, 0.7mn b/d of pure fuel liquids, and 2bn cfd of pure fuel, the disruption was mitigated swiftly by inventory withdrawals from its home and abroad shares, helped by its potential to shortly restore manufacturing, which helped reassure markets and scale back worth volatility (MEES, 27 September 2019).
Though the affect of previous crises on worth ranges and volatility various relying on market situations, the fast use of spare capability, the restricted measurement and length of disruptions, and market expectations all helped mitigate their affect. The oil and fuel services within the Gulf which are impacted within the present disaster, will nonetheless doubtless play an necessary function in restoring manufacturing. Spare capability within the area, lengthy considered a security valve in previous crises, isn’t taking part in its conventional function, and is prone to decline due to decrease manufacturing, the longer time wanted to revive it, and the truth that the priorities of the oil sector in some international locations could change after the disaster. Moreover, Iran and Russia could emerge from the disaster with extra resilient manufacturing than beforehand, because the US has eased its oil sanctions regimes and will battle to totally reimpose them once more.
Greater than a month into the disaster, there was no breakthrough, or readability as to how lengthy it might take to revive provides and rehabilitate manufacturing and dealing with services, or the place costs will settle within the medium to longer phrases. Most eventualities on the struggle’s geopolitical final result, its affect on oil and vitality relations, and its financial and monetary penalties, are typically pessimistic. These embody future oil and fuel costs, funding in upstream and downstream, the way forward for vitality transition, and the affect of the disaster on the world economic system and the economies of the area.
The IMF estimates that each 10% enhance within the oil worth reduces annual international GDP development by round 0.15 share factors and raises inflation by 0.4 share factors within the following yr, pushed by the elevated prices of vitality and meals, with the ultimate affect relying on the length of the battle and the harm inflicted on infrastructure. UNCTAD estimates that relying on the length and depth of the battle, development in international merchandise commerce is projected to decelerate from 4.7% in 2025 to 1.5% – 2.5% in 2026. UNDP tasks that the GDP of the Arab international locations of the Center East will contract by 3.7%-6% in 2026, with the GCC contracting by 5.2%-8.5%, whereas Oxford Economics tasks the GCC’s development within the first half of 2026 to gradual to 2%, in contrast with a pre-crisis forecast of 4.5%. FDI into the area is projected to gradual, in addition to customer arrivals to some beforehand enticing locations such because the UAE. Enterprise and funding sentiments might be impacted, together with the monetary markets, air transport exercise in some international locations in each the quick and medium time period, in addition to in sectors most uncovered to the interruption of provide chains.
*Prof. Majid al-Moneef is Chairman of the Saudi Affiliation for Power Economics and beforehand served as Saudi Arabia’s Governor to Opec.
